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 Autonomy is commonly seen as a fundamental value that should guide the federal regu-
lation of human subjects research. In this Article, we argue that autonomy is compromised, 
and should be compromised, for the sake of the welfare of research subjects and the welfare 
of people who stand to benefit from medical research. Such a compromise of autonomy is 
evident in regulatory exceptions to the requirement of informed consent, including the excep-
tions for emergency research and minimal-risk research. Less obviously, the blind clinical 
trial inherently represents a compromise of autonomy, as subjects are offered medical treat-
ment on the condition that they give up (1) the right to know what treatment they are receiv-
ing, and (2) the right to participate in decisionmaking about their treatment. While such an 
offer of treatment conditioned on a waiver of informed-consent rights does not contravene 
the libertarian conception of autonomy, it does contravene the liberal conception of autono-
my that is now dominant in bioethics. Autonomy is also compromised, on both the liberal 
and libertarian accounts, when access to experimental drugs is limited in order to channel 
people who are seeking those drugs into clinical trials.  
 We endorse most of the ways in which the regulation of human subjects research com-
promises autonomy for the sake of welfare. We also suggest some ways in which autonomy 
should be further subordinated to welfare, especially in the selection of research subjects. 
Researchers should select subjects who present a more favorable risk/benefit ratio, even if 
those subjects are less able to give autonomous consent. The necessity for this rule is illus-
trated by the Gelsinger case. In that case, researchers initially sought to test a gene-therapy 
treatment on terminal infants. They were persuaded instead to test the treatment on adults 
with a mild form of the disease, since those adults could give fully autonomous consent. One 
young adult subject died as a result; he would not have died if autonomy had been properly 
subordinated to welfare.
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Autonomy is commonly seen as a fundamental value that should 
guide the federal regulation of human subjects research. In this Arti-
cle, we argue that the autonomy of research subjects is compromised, 
and should be compromised, for the sake of the welfare of research 
subjects and the welfare of people who will benefit from medical re-
search. Our arguments are both positive (descriptive) and normative. 
We describe ways in which autonomy is compromised for the sake of 
welfare, and we endorse those aspects of the federal regulatory 
scheme. However, we do not believe that the balance is perfect. In 
some respects, autonomy should be compromised even further.  
 In Part II of this Article, we offer a preliminary discussion of the 
values of autonomy and welfare in the context of the federal regula-
tions governing human subjects research.1 We distinguish between 
the liberal conception of autonomy and the libertarian conception of 
autonomy. The liberal conception emphasizes informed consent, 
while the libertarian conception opposes coercive or fraudulent inter-
ference with personal decisions. The liberal conception is dominant in 
bioethics and is reflected in the federal regulations,2 but the libertar-
ian conception has influential advocates as well. In the regulation of 
human subjects research, autonomy is sometimes compromised more 
on one conception than on the other. 
 In Part III, we discuss the way in which restrictive drug laws 
channel people into volunteering to be subjects in clinical trials.3
When the law restricts access to experimental drugs in order to popu-
late clinical trials, it compromises the autonomy of patient volunteers 
for the sake of the beneficiaries of research. Objections to restrictive 
drug laws generally come from libertarians, but these laws actually 
compromise autonomy more severely under the liberal conception of 
autonomy: liberals often condemn inducements to become a research 
subject that fall far short of actual coercion.    
                                                                                                                  
 1. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2010); 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56 (2010).  
 2. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.116; 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (basic informed-consent provisions). 
 3. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(b)(3) (2006) (requiring that “the investigational drug 
or investigational device will not interfere with the initiation, conduct, or completion of 
clinical investigations to support marketing approval”); 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(c)(5) (requiring 
that “the investigational drug or investigational device will not interfere with the enroll-
ment of patients in ongoing clinical investigations”).  
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 In Part IV, we consider two regulatory exceptions to the require-
ment of informed consent: the exceptions for emergency research4
and minimal-risk research.5 Once again, these exceptions compro-
mise the autonomy of the subjects of research for the sake of the ben-
eficiaries of research. Probably the only way to deny that the emer-
gency-research and minimal-risk exceptions compromise autonomy is 
to adopt a theory of hypothetical consent as satisfying the dictates of 
autonomy. The hypothetical-consent approach, however, is contrary 
to the liberal conception of autonomy, as the liberal conception has a 
strong default presumption against experimentation. The hypothet-
ical-consent approach might be acceptable under a libertarian con-
ception of autonomy, but even there it is questionable.   
 In Part V, we argue that the blind clinical trial inherently repre-
sents a compromise of autonomy. In the blind clinical trial, subjects 
are offered medical treatment on the condition that they give up (1) 
the right to know what treatment they are receiving, and (2) the right 
to participate in decisionmaking about their treatment. While such an 
offer of treatment conditioned on a waiver of informed-consent rights 
does not contravene the libertarian conception of autonomy, it does 
contravene the dominant liberal conception of autonomy.  
 In all of the foregoing areas—the channeling of patients into clini-
cal trials, regulatory exceptions to informed consent, and the re-
quired waiver of informed-consent rights that is inherent in the blind 
clinical trial—we endorse the compromise of autonomy for welfare.  
 In Part VI, we consider the conflict between welfare and autonomy 
in the selection of research subjects. Here, autonomy is compromised 
for the sake of welfare to some extent, but welfare may also be com-
promised for the sake of autonomy. The regulations impose paternal-
istic limitations on the selection of subjects, compromising the auton-
omy of some would-be subjects by excluding them from experiments 
for the sake of their own welfare.6 Regrettably, however, the regula-
tions do not explicitly favor the selection of the subject group with the 
best risk/benefit ratio. In cases where members of the group with the 
best risk/benefit ratio cannot give fully autonomous consent, the reg-
ulations may actually disfavor selection of that group.7
 In the area of subject selection, autonomy should be further sub-
ordinated to welfare, as illustrated by the tragic Gelsinger case.8 In 
that case, researchers initially sought to test a gene-therapy treat-
ment on terminal infants. They were persuaded instead to test the 
                                                                                                                  
 4. 21 C.F.R. § 50.24; 61 Fed. Reg. 51,531 (Oct. 2, 1996) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46). 
 5. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d). 
 6. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(2). 
 7. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(3). 
 8. See generally Julian Savulescu, Harm, Ethics Committees and the Gene Therapy 
Death, 27 J. MED. ETHICS 148 (2001).  
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treatment on adults with a mild form of the disease, since those 
adults could give fully autonomous consent.9 One young adult subject 
died as a result; he would not have died if autonomy had been proper-
ly subordinated to welfare.10
 Although our arguments in this Article are both descriptive and 
normative, we believe that the Article’s chief contributions are its 
descriptive analysis of the conflict between welfare and autonomy 
and its elucidation of the distinction between liberal autonomy and 
libertarian autonomy. Readers may be surprised by the extent to 
which autonomy is subordinated to welfare in the regulation of hu-
man subjects research. On the other hand, it will probably surprise 
no one that two theorists sympathetic to welfarism take the welfarist 
side in normative questions. In presenting our normative positions, 
we are sometimes content merely to show how welfare is opposed to 
autonomy, and to invite readers to share our welfarist judgments.  
II.   WELFARE AND AUTONOMY IN THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS
 The values of welfare and autonomy are overlapping, vague, and 
contested. In this Part, we explore these values in the context of the 
federal regulations that govern most human subjects research in the 
United States. There are two important sets of regulations, which we 
will refer to as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
regulations and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regula-
tions.11 The FDA regulations govern research on products regulated 
by the FDA.12 The HHS regulations govern research conducted by the 
federal government, research that is federally funded, and research 
conducted by institutions that have accepted the regulations as bind-
ing even as to nonfunded research.13 The FDA regulations on human 
subjects research are for the most part identical to subparts A and D 
of the HHS regulations.14 Many studies are subject to both the FDA 
regulations and the HHS regulations.  
                                                                                                                  
 9.  Id. at 148. 
 10.  Id.
 11. This terminology is somewhat problematic, as the FDA is an agency within the 
HHS. But the FDA itself uses this terminology, see FDA, Comparison of FDA and HHS 
Human Subject Protection Regulations, http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/ 
RunningClinicalTrials/EducationalMaterials/ucm112910.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2011), 
and it is probably more accurate than alternatives. The HHS regulations are often referred 
to as the “Common Rule” because a number of agencies have adopted part or all of the 
HHS regulations verbatim. However, only subpart A is actually common to all the other 
agencies, and we will be referring at times to other parts of the HHS regulations.  
 12. 21 C.F.R. § 50.1(a). 
 13. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a); see, e.g., CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGU-
LATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 107 (2005).  
 14. Subpart D of the HHS regulations governs experimentation on children; it is es-
sentially duplicated in subpart D of the FDA regulations. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-46.409; 
21 C.F.R. §§ 50.50-50.56. Not duplicated in the FDA regulations are subpart C of the HHS 
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 The federal regulation of human subjects research largely oper-
ates through requirements directed at institutional review boards 
(IRBs). Some of these requirements appear to express a welfarist 
command, while others are associated with the value of autonomy.  
A. Overview of Criteria for IRB Approval of Research
 Section 46.111 of the HHS regulations is titled “Criteria for IRB 
approval of research.”15 Section 46.111(a)(2) states the requirement 
that “[r]isks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated ben-
efits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that 
may reasonably be expected to result.”16 This appears to be a welfar-
ist criterion. Risks to subjects must be balanced against the benefits 
both to subjects and to others who may benefit from the research. 
Greater benefits can justify greater risks. Another essentially welfar-
ist provision of the regulations is section 46.111(a)(1), which requires 
that “[r]isks to subjects are minimized: (i) By using procedures which 
are consistent with sound research design and which do not unneces-
sarily expose subjects to risk, and (ii) whenever appropriate, by using 
procedures already being performed on the subjects for diagnostic or 
treatment purposes.”17
 The regulations most clearly reflect the value of autonomy in im-
posing requirements of informed consent. Section 46.111(a)(4) of the 
HHS regulations requires, as a condition of IRB approval of research, 
that “[i]nformed consent will be sought from each prospective subject 
or the subject’s legally authorized representative, in accordance with, 
and to the extent required by §46.116.”18 Accordingly, 45 C.F.R. § 
46.116 states:  
Except as provided elsewhere in this policy, no investigator may 
involve a human being as a subject in research covered by this pol-
icy unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective in-
formed consent of the subject or the subject’s legally authorized 
representative. An investigator shall seek such consent only under 
circumstances that provide the prospective subject or the repre-
sentative sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to partic-
ipate and that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influ-
ence.19
                                                                                                                  
regulations, regarding prisoners, and subpart B, regarding pregnant women, neonates, and 
fetuses. Where the HHS regulations and the FDA regulations are substantially identical, 
we will refer to the HHS provision in the text and cite to both provisions in the notes.  
 15. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111. The parallel provision in the FDA regulations is 21 C.F.R. § 
56.111. 
 16. HHS, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2); FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(2).   
 17. HHS, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1); FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(1). 
 18. HHS, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(4); FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(4). 
 19. HHS, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116; see also FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 50.20. 
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This section goes on to list the information that must be provided to a 
prospective subject. The regulations also contain exceptions to the 
requirement of informed consent, some of which are discussed in Part 
IV below. 
 Another regulatory criterion for IRB approval of research is that 
the selection of subjects be “equitable.”20 Section 46.111(a)(3) provides 
that in making the assessment of whether selection is equitable: 
[T]he IRB should take into account the purposes of the research 
and the setting in which the research will be conducted and should 
be particularly cognizant of the special problems of research in-
volving vulnerable populations, such as children, prisoners, preg-
nant women, mentally disabled persons, or economically or educa-
tionally disadvantaged persons.21
 As discussed below in Part VI, this provision evinces some prefer-
ence for selecting subjects who can make an autonomous choice. To 
that extent, it also reflects the value of autonomy.  
B. What is Autonomy?
 We have been using the terms autonomy and welfare, and it is 
now time to look at these concepts more closely. Autonomy is an ex-
tremely slippery concept. Perhaps at the core of the concept of auton-
omy is the idea that people should be able to rule themselves rather 
than be ruled by others. However, there are many different concep-
tions of autonomy. We believe it is useful to distinguish between two 
broad conceptions, or families of conceptions, both of which will con-
cern us in what follows: the liberal conception and the libertarian 
conception. The liberal conception is dominant in bioethics and is re-
flected in the federal regulations. The libertarian conception is an 
important alternative that is prominent in other areas of the law, 
and that has some followers in bioethics as well. 
 Under the libertarian conception, government or private actors 
violate autonomy when they interfere, through force or fraud, with a 
person making his or her own decisions, unless those decisions would 
violate the rights of others. The libertarian conception of autonomy 
rejects paternalistic interference—interference that purports to be for 
the person’s own good—as well as interference motivated by  
other goals.  
 The dominant liberal conception of autonomy also condemns force 
and fraud. But the liberal conception endorses a degree of paternal-
ism that sets it apart from the libertarian conception.  
                                                                                                                  
 20. HHS, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3); FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(3). 
 21. HHS, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3); FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(3). 
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 Informed consent is a liberal principle, not a libertarian principle. 
The requirement that consent be informed is a form of paternalism; 
liberal autonomy will not honor a person’s decision to be a subject in 
an experiment unless that decision is made with full information, 
under conditions that conduce to full understanding and authentic 
choice. Libertarian autonomy, of course, endorses the requirement of 
consent, in human subjects research as in other social endeavors. 
However, libertarian autonomy cannot easily endorse the require-
ment of informed consent. Libertarianism respects the actual choices 
of people, whether or not those choices are made with full infor-
mation; libertarianism will not disregard the actual choices of people 
in a search for authentic choice. Libertarianism can endorse a re-
quirement of informed consent, if at all, only as a prophylactic meas-
ure, to prevent fraudulent inducement. 
 The influential text Principles of Biomedical Ethics,22 by Profes-
sors Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, is squarely in the liberal 
camp. Beauchamp and Childress write that “[p]ersonal autonomy 
encompasses, at a minimum, self-rule that is free from both control-
ling interference by others and from certain limitations such as an 
inadequate understanding that prevents meaningful choice.”23 Fur-
ther, “[t]o respect autonomous agents . . . requires more than nonin-
terference in others’ personal affairs. It includes, in some contexts, 
building up or maintaining others’ capacities for autonomous choice 
while helping to allay fears and other conditions that destroy or dis-
rupt autonomous action.”24
 Also squarely in the liberal camp is the Belmont Report, the 1979 
report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Sub-
jects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.25 The federal regula-
tions governing human subjects research are based in part on this 
report. The Belmont Report is somewhat idiosyncratic in using the 
term “respect for persons” in place of “autonomy.” Like most other 
bioethicists, we prefer the term “autonomy.”26
 We take Robert Nozick to be emblematic of libertarianism (the 
Nozick of Anarchy, State, and Utopia,27 as opposed to the Nozick of 
                                                                                                                  
 22. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
(6th ed. 2009).  
 23. Id. at 99. 
 24. Id. at 103.  
 25. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL 
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979) [hereinafter Belmont Report], available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html.   
 26. The term “respect for persons” is too general. Many principles can claim to be 
founded on a respect for persons, including utilitarianism. See, e.g., R.M. HARE, MORAL 
THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD AND POINT (1981). 
 27. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).  
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The Examined Life).28 Nozick is not particularly known for his views 
on bioethics, but that does not really matter: libertarians generally 
do not see bioethics as a special topic meriting special rules. Contem-
porary exponents of a libertarian approach to bioethics include Pro-
fessors Richard Epstein29 and Eugene Volokh.30   
 While we believe that the liberal/libertarian distinction is illuminat-
ing, it does not explain every dispute over the nature of autonomy. For 
example, the issue of whether hypothetical consent can satisfy auton-
omy, considered in Part IV, does not precisely track the liber-
al/libertarian divide. Also, the two camps are not monolithic. There are 
differences among liberals and differences among libertarians.   
 One heterodox libertarian view is that of Professors Cass Sunstein 
and Richard Thaler, who advocate what they call “libertarian pater-
nalism.”31 To us it seems that Sunstein and Thaler often advocate 
policies that are more libertarian than some available alternatives, 
but that are not actually libertarian. It is not our role to police those 
who want to use the libertarian label, but we will continue, for our 
own purposes, to draw a relatively sharp distinction between liber-
tarianism and liberalism, key to which is the libertarian attitude  
of antipaternalism. 
 Our discussion of specific issues in subsequent parts of this Article 
will illuminate the distinction between liberal autonomy and libertar-
ian autonomy. Readers can then decide whether the distinction is 
useful and has been convincingly deployed. We believe we are the 
first to deploy this distinction in a sustained fashion in the context of 
human subjects research.  
C. The Place of Autonomy and the Theoretical Basis of Informed 
Consent
 There are a number of ways of understanding the place of auton-
omy in bioethics and the theoretical basis of the principle of informed 
consent. First, autonomy can be seen as a fundamental value that 
underlies the principle of informed consent and constrains the pur-
                                                                                                                  
 28. ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 286-87 (1989) (“The libertarian position I 
once propounded now seems to me seriously inadequate . . . .”). By the end of his life, 
Nozick may have returned to libertarianism. See ROBERT NOZICK, INVARIANCES 263,  
281-82 (2001).  
 29. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Erosion of Individual Autonomy in Medical De-
cisionmaking: Of the FDA and IRBs, 96 GEO. L.J. 559 (2008) [hereinafter Epstein, The 
Erosion of Individual Autonomy in Medical Decisionmaking]; Richard A. Epstein, Contrac-
tual Principle Versus Legislative Fixes: Coming to Closure on the Unending Travails of 
Medical Malpractice, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 503 (2005). 
 30. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Thera-
pies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007).  
 31. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertar-
ian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). 
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suit of social welfare. This fundamental-constraint view of autonomy 
is similar to the way rights are often conceived in other contexts.    
 A second view sees autonomy not as an absolute constraint, but as 
one fundamental value in a pluralist system. Under the pluralist 
view, autonomy must sometimes bow to social welfare, and social 
welfare must sometimes bow to autonomy; neither value is supreme. 
The pluralist view agrees with the fundamental-constraint view in 
seeing autonomy as a fundamental value, but disagrees that auton-
omy is an absolute constraint. While the pluralist view may be less 
familiar to those outside the field of bioethics, it is very widely held, 
perhaps dominant, among bioethicists.32
 Those who hold to a liberal conception of autonomy are generally 
pluralists. Advocates of liberal autonomy generally do not oppose all 
policies that compromise liberal autonomy. They may support a poli-
cy that compromises autonomy if it serves some other important val-
ue, such as welfare.  
 A third view of the place of autonomy, to which we are somewhat 
sympathetic, claims that autonomy is not a fundamental value at all. 
Rather, autonomy is a purely instrumental value that serves to pro-
mote the welfare of research subjects. Under this view of autonomy 
as a welfare-promoting instrumental value, informed consent re-
quirements are justified as a means of protecting research subjects 
from an undue risk of harm (subjects being less likely to give in-
formed consent to research that poses such an undue risk of harm). 
 The value of autonomy is so often taken as fundamental that it 
may seem odd to suggest that the ultimate justification for autonomy 
and informed consent may be welfarist. However, a welfarist ground-
ing for consent requirements would have seemed less odd to those 
who first promulgated those requirements. As Beauchamp and Chil-
dress remark, “[t]hroughout the early history of concern about re-
search subjects, consent requirements were proposed primarily as a 
way to minimize the potential for harm.”33
 Our thesis that autonomy is and should be compromised for the sa-
ke of welfare entails a rejection of the view of autonomy as an absolute 
constraint on the pursuit of social welfare, both as a description of the 
nature of human subjects regulation and as a normative view as to 
how research should be regulated. However, nothing in this Article 
                                                                                                                  
 32. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 22; Belmont Report, supra note 25.  
 33. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 22, at 118. They go on to note that “since 
the mid-1970s the primary justification advanced for requirements of informed consent has 
been to protect autonomous choice, a loosely defined goal that institutions often bury in 
broad statements about protecting the rights of patients and research subjects.” Id.; see 
also JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT 18 (2d ed. 2001) (“The primary goals of 
informed consent are the protection of patient or subject welfare and the promotion of  
autonomy . . . .”).  
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entails a rejection of the pluralist view of autonomy, the view that au-
tonomy is one fundamental value among others. On each of the issues 
we address we come down on the welfarist side, but we do not seek to 
establish that autonomy should never prevail against welfare. Nor do 
we argue, as a descriptive matter, that the regulation of human sub-
jects research is now fully welfarist, so that welfare is never compro-
mised for the sake of autonomy. As discussed in Part VI, welfare may 
be compromised for the sake of autonomy to some extent.  
 Though our argument is consistent with a pluralist view, we at-
tempt to move the discussion farther toward the pole of welfare. 
Much of what we say will challenge specific views held by many plu-
ralists, if not their overall outlook. 
D. What is Welfare?
 There are three leading conceptions of welfare: the hedonic ac-
count, the informed-preference account, and the objective-list ac-
count.34 Under the hedonic account, positive welfare is a positive 
mental state or subjective experience, such as happiness or enjoy-
ment; negative welfare is a negative mental state such as unhappi-
ness or suffering. Under the informed-preference account, positive 
welfare is the satisfaction of informed preferences, while negative 
welfare is the frustration of informed preferences. 
 The objective-list account of welfare is less well-defined, and there 
is some question as to whether it is a welfarist position at all. Under 
the objective-list account, a thing X can contribute to a person’s wel-
fare even though the person does not experience X as good. Despite 
its name, the objective-list account is only partly objective; those who 
consider themselves welfarists never adopt a conception of welfare 
that is totally divorced from subjective experience.   
 One argument we advance in this Article is that the federal regu-
lations on human subjects research sometimes compromise (and 
should compromise) a subject’s autonomy for the sake of the subject’s 
own welfare. It might be thought that such an argument cannot be 
advanced based on the informed-preference account of welfare. The 
informed-preference account of welfare, it might be thought, must be 
identical to the informed-consent account of autonomy, so that if a 
person has given informed consent to be a subject, or is willing to do 
so, that can never be contrary to her welfare on the informed-
preference account of welfare—at least, it can never be contrary to 
her welfare ex ante. Therefore, it might be thought, if we say a sub-
ject’s autonomy is compromised for the sake of the subject’s own wel-
fare, we must hold to some alternative account of welfare, such as the 
                                                                                                                  
 34. See L. W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS (1996); ROBERT E. GOODIN,
UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 12-16 (1995); JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING (1986).  
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hedonic account (or an objective-list account that includes a  
hedonic element). 
 There is something to this line of reasoning. It is easier to see how 
a subject’s autonomy can be compromised for the sake of her welfare 
on the hedonic account of welfare than on the informed-preference 
account of welfare.  And indeed, the federal regulations do seem 
somewhat more consistent with the hedonic account of welfare than 
with the informed-preference account. Nevertheless, the informed- 
preference account of welfare is not precisely identical to the in-
formed-consent account of autonomy; the informed-preference ac-
count of welfare is generally more idealized. For example, a prefer-
ence between two courses of action may not be considered fully in-
formed unless it is the preference that the chooser would have if she 
could, counterfactually, experience the consequences of both courses 
of action, and then choose between them. So it is possible to compro-
mise a subject’s autonomy for the sake of her welfare, even if we 
adopt both an informed-consent account of autonomy and an in-
formed-preference account of welfare. 
 The Belmont report uses the term “beneficence” in place of “wel-
farism,” to describe the basic ethical principle giving rise to the rules 
“do not harm” and “maximize possible benefits and minimize possible 
harms.”35 Once again, we do not adopt that usage. “Beneficence” is a 
more general and slightly more idiosyncratic term than “welfarism.” 
Beneficence could embrace benefits other than welfare; for example, 
knowledge itself could be considered a benefit, regardless of its effects 
on welfare. Under such a nonwelfarist principle of beneficence, one 
could say that it is reasonable to risk harm to the welfare of subjects 
even if the welfare losses to subjects are not balanced by welfare 
gains to nonsubjects, but only by increased knowledge in the ab-
stract. Section 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) of the HHS regulations is it-
self susceptible to this interpretation, though we doubt many would 
embrace it. In any event, we use the term “welfarism,” rather than 
“beneficence,” because we believe that welfarism more accurately de-
scribes the meaning of the regulations and (even if it did not) because 
welfarism more accurately describes our own normative approach. 
E. From Individual Welfare to Social Welfare
 The most prominent welfarist theory of justice, and one for which 
we have considerable sympathy, is utilitarianism. The utilitarian 
theory of justice directs that welfare be maximized, with equal 
weight given to the welfare of everyone.36 Social welfare, according to 
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utilitarianism, is simply the unweighted sum (or average) of individ-
ual welfare. Thus, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) of the HHS regulations, 
with its command to balance risks and benefits, seems utilitarian  
in spirit.37    
 There are also more egalitarian welfarist theories. While utilitari-
anism gives equal weight to the welfare of everyone, more egalitarian 
welfarist theories (ironically) do not give equal weight to the welfare 
of everyone; they give extra weight to the welfare of people who have 
less welfare.38 For ease of analysis, we will assume a utilitarian ap-
proach that does not give extra weight to the welfare of those who are 
worse off. We believe that our analysis should also be of interest to 
those who hold more egalitarian welfarist views. 
 In the regulation of human subjects research, the issue of whether 
extra weight should be given to the welfare of those who are worse off 
is perhaps less relevant than the issue of whether extra weight 
should be given to the welfare of the subjects of research. By requir-
ing that risks to subjects be reasonable “in relation to anticipated 
benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that 
may reasonably be expected to result,”39 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) re-
quires that a balance be struck between the welfare of subjects and 
the welfare of the beneficiaries of research (most of whom are not 
subjects). Some might believe that it is never justified to compromise 
the expected welfare of subjects in order to increase the welfare of the 
beneficiaries of research; such a view would be contrary to 45 C.F.R. 
§ 46.111(a)(2). Others might believe that in striking the balance be-
tween subject welfare and beneficiary welfare, the welfare of subjects 
should matter more, as a fundamental matter, than the welfare of 
beneficiaries. Such a subject-weighted welfarist approach could be 
consistent with the regulatory scheme. 
 A welfarist approach that gives greater weight to the welfare of 
subjects than to the welfare of beneficiaries might seem to be contra-
ry to utilitarianism, since utilitarianism gives equal weight to the 
welfare of each. In fact, the issue is more complicated. As a matter of 
fundamental ethics, utilitarianism cannot value the welfare of sub-
jects more than the welfare of beneficiaries. As a matter of practice, 
however, utilitarianism does counsel IRBs to give more weight to 
subject welfare than nonsubject welfare. If the welfare of subjects is 
not sufficiently protected, people will not volunteer to be subjects. So 
an experiment that costs the life of one subject and saves the lives of 
                                                                                                                  
BEHAVIOR, AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 72 (Gerald Eberlein & Werner Leinfellner  
eds., 1976).  
 37. It does not necessarily reflect a thoroughgoing utilitarianism. 
 38. See generally STEIN, supra note 36. 
 39. HHS, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (2010); see also FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(2) (2010).  
2011] WELFARE VERSUS AUTONOMY  315
two nonsubjects could easily be bad for social welfare if it discourages 
people from becoming subjects in future experiments.40
 The balance between subject welfare and beneficiary welfare is an 
important issue in research ethics, but one that we, for the most part, 
do not address in this Article. We are interested in the opposition be-
tween autonomy and social welfare, whether social welfare is deter-
mined by subject welfare, nonsubject welfare, or both.  
F. Welfare Versus Autonomy
 As previously indicated, the value of welfare overlaps with the 
value of autonomy. The principle of informed consent, and the value 
of autonomy itself, can be seen as instrumental to welfare. Therefore, 
the conflicts between welfare and autonomy are not easy to tease out. 
It is wrong, for example, to think the mere requirement of informed 
consent shows that autonomy has prevailed over welfare, as the re-
quirement of informed consent can be justified on welfarist grounds.  
 One way of posing the conflict between welfare and autonomy is 
through farfetched hypothetical examples. Suppose that one person’s 
body has unique properties such that researchers can find a cure for 
cancer (all cancers) through use of his tissues. Unfortunately, the 
necessary experiments cannot be done without killing the prospective 
subject, and he is unwilling to volunteer. In this highly imaginary 
situation, we believe it would be right to conscript the subject, killing 
him but saving millions of others.41 Others may have a different  
intuitive response. 
 Such imaginary cases have their place, and we have given them a 
place in our prior work. But questions are bound to linger, even 
though we attempt to stipulate them away. How do we know that 
experimenting on this unfortunate individual will yield a cure for 
cancer? Why is it necessary to kill him? If his tissues are so scientifi-
cally valuable, wouldn’t it be better to leave him alive? 
 In the example as given, the good that can be done is so enormous 
that it tends to wash out such doubts. But if we start to reduce the 
number of people who can be saved, the lingering questions gain 
force and can render the example, in our view, an illegitimate test of 
moral intuitions.  
 Imaginary cases are well deployed, from a welfarist perspective, in 
the work of Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell. In their 
book Fairness Versus Welfare,42 Kaplow and Shavell demonstrate 
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 42. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). Our title 
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that notions of fairness that depart from welfarism can, in a highly 
stylized hypothetical setting, reduce the welfare of everyone. Auton-
omy, under either a liberal conception or a libertarian conception, is a 
notion of fairness that can depart from welfarism. Therefore, it 
should be possible to deliver a Kaplow-Shavellian critique of autono-
my in human subjects research, using examples such as they offer in 
their book.43          
 We have chosen not to do so. While we make use of the occasional 
simplifying assumption and hypothetical case, in the main we pre-
sent actual conflicts between welfare and autonomy for the judgment 
of the reader. This normative approach dovetails better with our de-
scriptive project. And while it can be hard to tease out the actual con-
flicts between welfare and autonomy, there is doubtless something to 
be said for basing normative judgments on real-world situations ra-
ther than on imaginary cases.   
III.   CHANNELING SUBJECTS INTO CLINICAL TRIALS
 We begin by considering the way in which restrictive drug laws 
channel medical patients into clinical trials of new drugs. The FDA 
oversees a lengthy drug-approval process, including at least three 
phases of human trials. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA) generally prohibits the sale of new drugs that have not been 
approved by the FDA.44 The restriction of access to unapproved drugs 
may be experienced as burdensome by terminally ill patients who 
may believe that an unapproved drug offers their only chance of sur-
vival. There are some avenues to expanded access, discussed below, 
but access is still limited, even for the terminally ill.  
 In Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von 
Eschenbach,45 the plaintiffs mounted a constitutional challenge to the 
system of restricted access to unapproved drugs. The case received a 
great deal of attention when a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit 
accepted the plaintiffs’ view that there was a constitutional right of 
access by the terminally ill to experimental drugs that had passed 
Phase I safety testing, but had not yet been approved by the FDA.46
                                                                                                                  
 43. Some of the real conflicts we discuss seem not to lend themselves to hypothetical 
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 45. 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
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However, this temporary victory for the plaintiffs was reversed by 
the court en banc, which held that there was no constitutional right 
of access to unapproved drugs.47
 The system of restricted access to unapproved drugs compromises 
the autonomy of medical patients both for their own sake (a paternal-
istic restriction) and also for the sake of future patients who may bene-
fit from the promotion of drug research through the clinical-trial sys-
tem. We are more concerned with the research-based justification for 
restricted access, but we will first review the paternalistic justification.  
 The regulation of drugs reflects the paternalistic view that people 
would make worse decisions about drugs if drugs were unregulated. 
We assume that this paternalistic view is correct: people really are 
better off, on average, than they would be under a system of unregu-
lated drugs. On that assumption, we have no problem endorsing the 
regulation of drugs.48
 Many feel that paternalistic drug regulation is less justified with 
respect to the terminally ill, because the terminally ill have less to 
lose. But as the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Ruther-
ford (the Laetrile case),49 there is a place for paternalism even with 
respect to the terminally ill:   
[T]he concept of safety . . . is not without meaning for terminal pa-
tients . . . . For the terminally ill, as for anyone else, a drug is un-
safe if its potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not off-
set by the possibility of therapeutic benefit . . . . Moreover, there is 
a special sense in which the relationship between drug effective-
ness and safety has meaning in the context of incurable illnesses . . 
. . [I]f an individual suffering from a potentially fatal disease re-
jects conventional therapy in favor of a drug with no demonstrable 
curative properties, the consequences can be irreversible . . . The 
FDA’s practice also reflects the recognition, amply supported by 
expert medical testimony in this case, that with diseases such as 
cancer it is often impossible to identify a patient as terminally ill 
except in retrospect.  
 . . . Since the turn of the century, resourceful entrepreneurs 
have advertised a wide variety of purportedly simple and painless 
cures for cancer . . . . [T]his historical experience . . . suggest[s] 
why Congress could reasonably have determined to protect the 
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terminally ill, no less than other patients, from the vast range of 
self-styled panaceas that inventive minds can devise.50
These passages were quoted, in part, in the en banc decision in  
Abigail Alliance.51
 So one justification for restricted access to unapproved drugs, even 
for the terminally ill, is paternalistic. But while the paternalistic 
regulation of drugs represents a compromise of autonomy, especially 
on the libertarian account of autonomy, it is not really a compromise 
of autonomy in human subjects research. For that reason, we are 
more concerned with the second justification for restricted access to 
unapproved drugs: that access must be restricted in order to main-
tain the clinical-trial system. In clinical trials of potentially life-
saving drugs, subjects are randomly assigned to receive either stand-
ard treatment or experimental treatment (there is no placebo arm, 
absent unusual circumstances). The fear is that if those seeking ex-
perimental drugs have free access, they will not volunteer to be sub-
jects in a clinical trial, where they will likely have no more than a 
fifty percent chance of receiving the experimental drugs they seek.  
 The research-based justification of restricted access is based not on 
the welfare of those who currently seek access to unapproved drugs, 
but on the welfare of the beneficiaries of research. This justification 
was not stressed by the court in Abigail Alliance in its en banc deci-
sion; the court en banc was far more concerned with the paternalistic 
justification.52 However, the potential disruption of the clinical-trial 
system as a result of unrestricted access was of great concern to the 
medical and scientific community.53 This concern was not entirely 
speculative; in the 1980s and 1990s, the wide availability of autologous 
bone marrow transplant as part of a treatment for metastatic breast 
cancer made it difficult to enroll subjects in randomized trials of the 
treatment, and consequently delayed the trials. When the trials were 
finally completed, it was discovered that high-dose chemotherapy with 
bone marrow transplant was inferior to standard chemotherapy.54
 The research-based justification for limited access, along with the 
paternalistic justification, is inconsistent with the libertarian concep-
tion of autonomy. Referring to the research-based justification, Ep-
stein writes that “cutting off nonparticipation alternatives that would 
otherwise be available smacks of a second-tier form of compulsion 
that should be greeted with some suspicion.”55 Volokh assumes that 
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the research-based justification could support some limitations on 
access under current constitutional doctrine, but he also expresses 
his distaste for that justification, and in even stronger terms: 
“[S]ociety would balk at a law that generally forced people to go into 
clinical trials, and a law that forces people to go into clinical trials if 
they want access to the only possibly lifesaving drugs seems to be no 
less coercive.”56
 While libertarians such as Volokh and Epstein have been most re-
sistant to the research-based justification for limited access, the chan-
neling of subjects into clinical trials may be even more questionable un-
der the liberal conception of autonomy. The liberal conception of auton-
omy, far more than the libertarian one, is concerned with the way sub-
jects are induced into volunteering for experiments. The liberal concep-
tion condemns inducements that fall far short of actual coercion.  
 The HHS regulations provide: “An investigator shall seek . . . con-
sent only under circumstances that provide the prospective subject or 
the representative sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not 
to participate and that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue 
influence.”57 The phrase “undue influence” is vague, but one source of 
influence that has been of concern to bioethicists in the dominant lib-
eral camp is monetary; many liberal bioethicists are concerned that 
subjects should not be paid too much to enter clinical trials.58 Another 
indication of the kind of influence considered “undue” under the lib-
eral conception of autonomy is 45 C.F.R. § 46.305(a)(2) of the HHS 
regulations, regarding the recruitment of prisoners:  
Any possible advantages accruing to the prisoner through his or 
her participation in the research, when compared to the general 
living conditions, medical care, quality of food, amenities and op-
portunity for earnings in the prison, [must not be] of such a magni-
tude that his or her ability to weigh the risks of the research 
against the value of such advantages in the limited choice envi-
ronment of the prison is impaired . . . .59
In other words, the experience of being in a clinical trial cannot be too 
attractive to a prisoner, or his capacity to give informed consent will 
be considered to be impaired. Now compare these inducements, ques-
tionable under the liberal conception of autonomy, to the pressure 
represented by disallowing access to a drug so as to channel people 
into a clinical trial. Surely, the channeling pressure exerted by re-
strictive drug laws (possibly life-saving drug available only by partic-
ipation in a clinical trial) is as great as the channeling pressure on 
                                                                                                                  
 56. Volokh, supra note 30, at 1830 n.81.   
 57. HHS, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2010); see also FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2010). 
 58. See generally COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 395-407.  
 59. 45 C.F.R. § 46.305(a)(2). There is no FDA analog. 
320 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:303 
prisoners (more attractive living conditions available only by partici-
pation in a clinical trial), at least for some patients who seek access 
to an experimental drug.  
 IRBs of course do not consider whether limited access to unap-
proved drugs represents an undue inducement. They take the system 
of drug regulation as given, and consider only inducements within that 
system. But if IRBs applied the same standard of undue influence to 
the public-policy question of whether restricted access is justified as a 
way of channeling people into clinical trials, they presumably would 
reject this justification as inconsistent with liberal autonomy. 
A. Normative Evaluation
 For the sake of normative analysis, it would be useful to separate 
the paternalistic justification for restrictive drug laws from the re-
search-based justification. Suppose we were convinced by the pater-
nalistic justification—convinced both that terminal patients would be 
better off, on average, with drug regulation and that their greater 
expected welfare justified this compromise of their autonomy. It 
would be hard, then, to evaluate the research-based justification, for 
we would have already accepted the policy as fully justified on  
another basis.60
 Fortunately, the federal rules on expanded access to unapproved 
drugs make it relatively easy to factor out the paternalistic justifica-
tion for limited access and evaluate only the research-based justifica-
tion. Section 561 of the FDCA is titled “Expanded Access to Unap-
proved Therapies and Diagnostics.”61 This provision authorizes the 
FDA to give expanded access to unapproved drugs for serious diseas-
es, provided certain conditions are met. One of the conditions is that 
the FDA must determine that expanded access will not impair clini-
cal trials.62 The FDA’s recently adopted final rule on expanded access 
contains this condition as well.63
 There are also paternalistic conditions in the statutory provision 
on expanded access and in the FDA final rule.64 But the condition 
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that expanded access to unapproved drugs not impair clinical trials 
obviously contemplates situations in which the paternalistic condi-
tions are satisfied, and the only thing standing between patients and 
the unapproved drugs they seek is the research-based justification 
for limited access to unapproved drugs.   
 We can therefore reformulate the issue as whether the condition 
against impairment of clinical trials belongs in the law. When the 
FDA has no paternalistic objection to access to unapproved drugs, 
should expanded access be provided, even if it will impair clinical tri-
als, leading to excess deaths in the future?65 To sharpen the case, we 
can assume that every patient with a given type of terminal cancer is 
permitted to buy an unapproved drug, except those who are eligible 
for inclusion in a clinical trial of the drug. Would this be justified? 
Ultimately, each observer may have his or her own intuitive response 
to this issue, but some arguments can be made.  
 Volokh and Epstein analogize the channeling of medical patients 
into clinical trials, through restrictive drug laws, to actual physical 
coercion, or to a law mandating enrollment in trials.66 Let us consider 
this analogy. If there were an actual program of coerced experimen-
tation, many people would unwillingly receive experimental medical 
treatment that is likely to fail. Only a small percentage of drugs en-
tering Phase I trials are ultimately approved; for cancer drugs in the 
period 1991-2000, the approval rate was five percent.67 If there were 
an actual program of coerced experimentation, patients would be 
forced to forego standard treatments of some proven effectiveness (for 
example, standard chemotherapy) and to receive instead an experi-
mental treatment that is unlikely to be as safe and effective as the 
standard treatment.  
 By contrast, the channeling of patients into trials through restric-
tive drug laws does not subject anyone to involuntary experimental 
procedures. It is only patients who want to undergo an experimental 
treatment who feel any pressure from restrictive drug laws to enter 
clinical trials. Patients who do not want an experimental treatment 
experience no pressure at all to enter a clinical trial. For this reason 
alone, channeling through restrictive drug laws is clearly less bur-
densome than would be a program of actual coerced experimentation.   
 Another way of approaching the issue is through the moralized 
conception of coercion advocated by Professor Alan Wertheimer.68
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Under this approach, channeling patients into clinical trials through 
restrictive drug laws can be considered coercive and wrong if patients 
have a moral right to obtain unapproved drugs outside the context of 
the trials. We believe that there is a presumptive moral right to re-
ceive necessary medical treatment. This is not just a negative right 
against interference by the government with the private purchase of 
treatment, but a positive right to public provision.69 However, exper-
imental medical treatment cannot, as a general matter, be considered 
necessary medical treatment.70 Furthermore, the basis of the pre-
sumptive moral right to necessary medical treatment, we believe, is 
largely or wholly welfarist; therefore, the right does not obviously 
apply if it would impair social welfare.   
 In summary, restrictive drug laws compromise autonomy, under 
both the liberal and libertarian conceptions of autonomy. Accepting 
the expert view of the FDA that restricted access to unapproved 
drugs is necessary to populate clinical trials, the compromise of au-
tonomy is justified. 
IV.   EXCEPTIONS TO INFORMED CONSENT REQUIREMENTS:
EMERGENCY RESEARCH AND MINIMAL-RISK RESEARCH
 People who are “channeled” into a clinical trial still go through an 
informed-consent procedure. Sometimes, however, the federal regula-
tions governing human subjects research permit experiments with no 
consent at all, through exceptions to the requirement of informed 
consent. Two regulatory exceptions in particular appear to compro-
mise autonomy: those for emergency-care research and minimal-risk 
research. After describing these exceptions and providing a guarded 
welfarist endorsement of each, we will consider whether they do in 
fact compromise autonomy. 
A. Emergency Care Research
 Under both the HHS regulations and the FDA regulations, IRBs 
may waive the requirement of informed consent for emergency-care 
research, provided certain conditions are met. Among these condi-
tions are that the research subjects are in a “life-threatening situa-
tion” and consequently unable to give informed consent; “available 
treatments are unproven or unsatisfactory”; there is no time to ob-
tain consent from legally authorized representatives; participation in 
the research “holds out the prospect of direct benefit to the subjects” 
(i.e., it is therapeutic research); and there has been consultation 
                                                                                                                  
 69. See Mark S. Stein, Necessity, Not Autonomy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2007), available at
http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/seealso/vol86/pdf/86TexasLRevSeeAlso15.pdf. 
 70. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
2011] WELFARE VERSUS AUTONOMY  323
“with representatives of the communities in which the clinical inves-
tigation will be conducted and from which the subjects will be 
drawn.”71 The emergency exception was added to the regulations  
in 1996.72
 The welfarist case for an emergency-research exception is very 
strong. Some medical innovations must be tested, if at all, only on 
patients who are unable to give informed consent or even substituted 
consent. If there can be no testing without consent, great advances 
may be lost. The problem is particularly severe if the innovation is a 
new drug. In that case, the new product cannot be used unless it is 
tested in human trials; if it cannot be tested, it will never be used. 
The problem is not quite so severe with new surgical techniques and 
other innovations that do not require FDA approval. 
 Successful trials of thrombolytic (clot-dissolving) drugs for heart 
attack, conducted in the 1980s, provide some indication of how im-
portant an emergency exception can be. As related by Collins, Doll, 
and Peto, a large trial was conducted both in Britain and in the Unit-
ed States. In Britain, informed-consent requirements were flexible, 
but in the United States, the trial protocol required that doctors pre-
sent a lengthy consent form to the patients (there was as yet no 
emergency exception).73 Collins, Doll, and Peto suggest that because 
of what they call the “inhumane US consent procedure,”74 recruit-
ment into the trial was much slower in the United States than in 
Britain, delaying the end of the trial by six months. They estimate 
that as the trial results “have transformed medical practice” world-
wide, the delay in United States recruitment resulted in “about 
10,000 unnecessary deaths.”75 This may be an exaggerated estimate, 
but the most chilling aspect of the tale is that if there were no emer-
gency research exception, a similarly valuable innovation today 
might not be tested at all.76   
 Experience under the emergency-research exception, unfortu-
nately, has not been all one could have hoped. Several of the early 
trials conducted under the waiver were for blood substitutes, which 
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ING NEW TREATMENTS FOR CANCER 54-55 (1992).  
 74. Id. at 55.  
 75. Id.
 76. Ironically, while a trial of drugs to treat heart attack would now presumably be 
eligible for a waiver of informed-consent requirements in the United States, those require-
ments have become stricter in the European Union, and emergency-care research has be-
come more difficult. See Malcolm G. Booth, Informed Consent in Emergency Research: A 
Contradiction in Terms, 13 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 351 (2007). 
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were administered to trauma victims without consent. The blood 
substitute trials led to excess deaths; according to one meta-analysis, 
use of a blood substitute increased the risk of death by thirty per-
cent.77 These unfortunate results should remind us that the require-
ment of informed consent does have considerable instrumental value 
in preventing harm to subjects.78
B. Minimal-Risk Research
 The HHS regulations, but not the FDA regulations, also permit 
IRBs to waive or alter informed consent requirements if “[t]he re-
search involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects,” and if 
additional conditions are met, including that the research “could not 
practicably be carried out without the waiver.”79 Minimal risk is de-
fined, in Subpart A of the HHS regulations, as meaning that “the 
probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the 
research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily 
encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physi-
cal or psychological examinations or tests.”80
 The minimal-risk exception is commonly used to obtain authoriza-
tion for deceptive psychological experiments. As deception is a neces-
sary part of these experiments, they cannot “practicably” be done if 
the subjects are given full information. Another use for the minimal-
risk exception, which has aroused some controversy, is to authorize 
unconsented-to research on identified medical records or identified 
                                                                                                                  
 77. See Charles Natanson et al., Cell-Free Hemoglobin-Based Blood Substitutes and 
Risk of Myocardial Infarction and Death: A Meta-Analysis, 299 JAMA 2304, 2306 (2008). 
 78. Though there was also a blood substitute trial of consenting orthopedic patients, 
conducted in Sweden. Christina Olofsson et al., A Multicenter Clinical Study of the Safety 
and Activity of Maleimide-Polyethylene Glycol-Modified Hemoglobin (Hemospan) in Pa-
tients Undergoing Major Orthopedic Surgery, 105 ANESTHESIOLOGY 1153 (2006).  
 79. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (2010). In its entirety, the exception reads as follows:  
An IRB may approve a consent procedure which does not include, or which al-
ters, some or all of the elements of informed consent set forth in this section, or 
waive the requirements to obtain informed consent provided the IRB finds and 
documents that: 
(1) The research involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects; 
(2) The waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of 
the subjects; 
(3) The research could not practicably be carried out without the waiver or al-
teration; and 
(4) Whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional perti-
nent information after participation. 
Id.
 80. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i). There are some uncertainties and disputes about the mean-
ing of this definition. See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 280-81. Also, there is a some-
what different definition of “minimal risk” in Subpart C, governing research on prisoners: 
“Minimal risk is the probability and magnitude of physical or psychological harm that is 
normally encountered in the daily lives, or in the routine medical, dental, or psychological 
examination of healthy persons.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.303(d) (emphasis added).  
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stored tissue samples.81 Such research may present no more than 
minimal risk if the risk of a damaging disclosure of private infor-
mation is sufficiently low.82 However, there is disagreement over the 
“impracticable” requirement: if it would be costly and time-
consuming to seek consent for the analysis of identified stored tissue 
samples, does that make it “impracticable”?83     
 The minimal-risk exception seems generally justified based on 
welfarist considerations. The less risk of harm an experiment poses, 
the less need there is for informed consent as a means to prevent  
that harm. 
C. Do the Emergency and Minimal-Risk Exceptions Compromise  
Autonomy?
 If the principle of informed consent means that it is forbidden to 
experiment on people without their informed consent (or the in-
formed consent of their legal representatives), then obviously the 
emergency-research exception and the minimal-risk exception violate 
the principle of informed consent. And if this interpretation of in-
formed consent expresses the meaning of autonomy, then these ex-
ceptions compromise autonomy.   
 The emergency-research exception is indeed generally seen as 
compromising autonomy for the sake of the welfare of research bene-
ficiaries. Baruch Brody, for example, writes that the FDA’s emergen-
cy regulations could not be justified if informed consent were seen as 
an absolute value: “[T]he FDA regulations represent the triumph of 
pluralistic casuistry over the absolutism of single values. To my 
mind, this is a welcome development in research ethics.”84 Jay Katz, 
a leading advocate of informed consent, has reservations about as-
pects of the emergency exception, but he agrees that some exception 
is justified in the emergency context, and he further agrees that such 
an exception compromises autonomy:  
While the principle of self-determination in the conduct of human 
experimentation should not lightly be set aside, I have always be-
lieved that principles must have exceptions as long as they are rig-
orously justified and most narrowly drawn. A waiver of informed 
                                                                                                                  
 81. If records or tissue samples are not identifiable, or if the researcher does not rec-
ord identifiable information, the regulations do not require researchers to obtain informed 
consent. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.102(f)(2), 46.101(b)(4).  
 82. There is a parallel exception under the HIPAA regulations. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512. 
 83. See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 719.  
 84. Baruch A. Brody, New Perspectives on Emergency Room Research, HASTINGS CEN-
TER REP, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 7, 9. 
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consent in the situations encompassed by the regulations can be 
justified and my reservations are not that a waiver was granted.85
 The minimal-risk exception arguably represents an even greater 
compromise of autonomy than the emergency-research exception. 
Under the minimal-risk exception, consent can be waived or altered 
by the IRB if it would be “impracticable” to obtain full informed con-
sent, even though subjects are actually able to consent. From the 
standpoint of autonomy, it may be worse to waive consent when the 
subject can consent (but seeking consent would be impracticable) 
than when the subject cannot consent at all. 
 Probably the only way to deny that the two exceptions compromise 
autonomy for the sake of welfare is to adopt a theory of hypothetical 
consent as satisfying the dictates of autonomy.86 Professor Russell 
Korobkin has advocated this theory in connection with the minimal-
risk exception and research on stored tissue samples;87 it could also be 
used to justify some applications of the emergency-research exception. 
 Suppose that a person cannot consent to be a subject, or that the 
experiment will not be done if consent must be sought. Under the hy-
pothetical-consent view, the question becomes whether the prospec-
tive subject would have consented if, counterfactually, the person had 
been able to give fully informed consent. If there is hypothetical con-
sent—if the person would have consented to be a subject had the per-
son been able to do so—there is no violation of autonomy. Indeed, it 
could be argued, under the hypothetical-consent view, that if a per-
son would have consented to be a subject, it is a violation of autono-
my not to include that person as a subject. Korobkin advances this 
argument in rejecting a rule that would always require researchers 
to obtain consent before doing stem-cell research on stored tissue 
samples; that rule, he claims, “would protect the autonomy of those 
who would have declined to participate, but it would undermine the 
autonomy of those who would have agreed to participate but are ef-
fectively prohibited from making that choice.”88
 What if our best judgment is that some prospective subjects would 
have consented and some would have refused? On stored tissue sam-
ples, Korobkin believes that we should follow a hypothetical majori-
tarian approach, effecting “what would have been the autonomous 
                                                                                                                  
 85. Jay Katz, Blurring the Lines: Research, Therapy, and IRBs, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 7, 9.
 86. As to one application of the minimal-risk exception—regarding stored tissue sam-
ples and medical records—it may be possible to deny that there is an autonomy interest at 
all. We do not pursue this possibility here. 
 87. RUSSELL KOROBKIN WITH STEPHEN R. MUNZER, STEM CELL CENTURY 168-69 
(2007); Russell Korobkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Nontherapeutic Biomedical 
Research, 54 UCLA L. REV. 605, 624-25 (2007). 
 88. Korobkin, supra note 87, at 624 (referring to guidelines of the National  
Research Council).  
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choice of most tissue providers.”89 Strikingly, a hypothetical majori-
tarian approach gives no greater weight to the unwillingness of some 
people to be subjects than to the altruistic willingness of others to be 
subjects; it does not make abstention from experimentation the  
default position.90
 With respect to research activities that may be eligible for the min-
imal-risk exception, the hypothetical-consent view implies that two 
counterfactual requirements must be satisfied. It is necessary, of 
course, that most of the subjects would have given informed consent. 
But in addition, informed consent can only be waived if requiring in-
formed consent would have prevented the research from being con-
ducted. If it would be difficult and expensive for researchers to seek 
informed consent, but they would still do so if required, then they must 
do so; in that situation, it is possible to give effect to the actual auton-
omous choices of all prospective subjects, both those who consent to be 
a subject and those who decline. In principle, then, the hypothetical-
consent view suggests that high-value research should be less eligible 
for a waiver of consent than low-value research, as researchers will 
more likely be willing to seek consent for high-value research.  
 In considering the possible application of the hypothetical-consent 
view to emergency research, it is useful to compare the emergency 
exception to informed consent in research, contained in the federal 
regulations, with the common-law emergency exception to informed 
consent in the treatment setting. The justification for the emergency-
treatment exception is often expressed in hypothetical, counterfactu-
al terms: “[S]ince reasonable persons would consent to treatment in 
an emergency if they were able to do so, it is presumed that any par-
ticular patient would consent under the same circumstances.”91 Such 
explanations of the emergency-treatment exception might be taken to 
suggest that the emergency-research exception can also be justified 
based on a hypothetical-consent approach. However, emergency 
treatment without consent benefits the patient. We cannot say the 
same of emergency experimentation without consent. Indeed, the 
emergency-treatment exception is strictly limited to necessary proce-
dures; it does not extend even to beneficial actions that are not nec-
essary, much less to procedures that are primarily designed to bene-
fit those other than the patient.92 In short, if the emergency-research 
                                                                                                                  
 89. Id.
 90. What if the majoritarian approach were applied to a situation of actual consent 
rather than hypothetical consent? Suppose that researchers proposed to experiment on a 
group of people that for some reason could not be separated. A majority of the group con-
sented, but a minority objected. Would it be more consistent with autonomy to experiment 
on the unwilling minority than to abstain from experimenting on the willing majority? This 
is not a rhetorical question.  
 91. BERG ET AL., supra note 33, at 76. 
 92. Id. at 77-78. 
328 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:303 
exception were tested under the standard used for the emergency-
treatment exception, the emergency-research exception would almost 
always fail.  
 What, then, should we make of the view that exceptions to in-
formed consent do not compromise autonomy if there is hypothetical 
consent? The hypothetical-consent view is pretty clearly inconsistent 
with the dominant liberal conception of autonomy. The liberal con-
ception has a strong default position against experimentation, as evi-
denced by its preoccupation with informed consent. Beauchamp and 
Childress explicitly reject the hypothetical-consent view: “Consent 
should refer to an individual’s actual choices, not to presumptions 
about the choices the individual would or should make.”93
 Hypothetical consent can perhaps more easily be integrated into 
the libertarian conception of autonomy. The libertarian conception of 
autonomy does not have so strong a default position against experi-
mentation, in the sense of requiring far more informed consent to 
participate in an experiment than not to participate. As noted, liber-
tarians tend not to see the decision to enter an experiment as being a 
special decision, subject to special rules. On the other hand, many 
who hold the libertarian conception of autonomy would likely see ex-
perimentation without consent, for emergency research or minimal-
risk research, as a coerced exchange necessitating compensation.94
Many libertarians would likely be skeptical of the idea that hypothet-
ical consent can excuse compensation.  
 In our opinion, the emergency-research exception and the mini-
mal-risk exception do compromise autonomy for the sake of nonsub-
ject welfare. The hypothetical-consent approach cannot reconcile the-
se exceptions to autonomy under the dominant liberal conception of 
autonomy, and hypothetical consent is questionable even under the 
libertarian conception of autonomy. It also bears repeating that some 
applications of the two exceptions could not be justified even under a 
hypothetical-consent approach.  
 While the two exceptions compromise autonomy, they are never-
theless probably justified on welfarist grounds. They only lack justifi-
cation if they are self-defeating, if they do not actually result in 
greater welfare. 
                                                                                                                  
 93. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 33. They add that there can be implied 
consent based on choices actually made. 
 94. With respect to minimal-risk research, this assumes that there is a libertarian 
right against the kind of activity or interaction constituting the experiment. Libertarians 
probably do not recognize a generalized right not to be the subject of an experiment: there 
are rights to bodily integrity, to property, etc., and researchers need obtain consent only if 
they would violate one of these rights.  
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V.   OFFER OF TREATMENT ON CONDITION THAT SUBJECTS WAIVE 
INFORMED CONSENT
 The exceptions to informed consent discussed above are at the pe-
riphery of human subjects research. In this Part, we argue that the 
blind clinical trial,95 which is at the core of human subjects research, 
inherently involves a compromise of autonomy. In the blind clinical 
trial, subjects are offered medical treatment on the condition that 
they give up (1) the right to know what treatment they are receiving, 
and (2) the right to participate in decisionmaking about their treat-
ment. Such an offer of treatment conditioned on a waiver of treat-
ment-related informed-consent rights does not contravene the liber-
tarian conception of autonomy, but it does contravene the dominant 
liberal conception of autonomy.  
 We emphasize that we do not consider the blind clinical trial to be 
unethical. It is ethical, even though it inherently compromises liberal 
autonomy, because it serves social welfare.   
 In order to clarify issues of autonomy and required waiver, let us 
first suppose that researchers offered subjects participation in a clin-
ical trial in exchange for the waiver of informed-consent rights that 
are contained in the regulations governing human subjects research. 
For example, the regulations require disclosure of “any reasonably 
foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject.”96 Suppose that clini-
cal researchers offered subjects enrollment in a clinical trial on the 
condition that the subjects give up any right to know of foreseeable 
risks and discomforts. In a study governed by the regulations, that 
would be a violation of the regulations. There are a small number of 
clinical studies that are not governed by either the HHS or FDA reg-
ulations; in those studies, an offer of enrollment in a trial conditioned 
on a waiver of information about risks would not violate the regula-
tions. But the question, in either case, is whether such an offer would 
constitute a compromise of autonomy. 
 From a libertarian perspective, an offer of enrollment in a trial 
conditioned on a waiver of information about risks probably would 
not constitute a compromise of autonomy. The researchers are offer-
ing potential subjects a “capitalist act[] between consenting adults,” 
to quote Robert Nozick.97 The researchers are truthfully and un-
fraudulently explaining the information that potential subjects must 
agree to forego if they are to be accepted into the study: any infor-
mation about risks. From a libertarian perspective, a subject who ac-
                                                                                                                  
 95. Most clinical trials are blind (or double-blind or triple-blind); the subjects are not 
told what treatment they are receiving, lest that knowledge affect their perception of the 
effectiveness of the treatment.  
 96. HHS, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2) (2010); FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(2) (2010). 
 97. NOZICK, supra note 27, at 163. 
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cepts such an offer has not experienced a compromise of autonomy; 
the subject has exercised his autonomy.98     
 The libertarian analysis of this hypothetical offer of enrollment 
conditioned on a waiver of information about risks demonstrates the 
point we made in the Introduction that informed consent (as opposed 
to simply consent) is a liberal principle, not a libertarian principle. 
Under the dominant liberal conception of autonomy, it should be 
clear, the hypothetical offer of inclusion conditioned on waiver of 
knowledge about risks would compromise autonomy. Informed con-
sent should be respected and promoted, under the liberal view, and 
an attempt to contract around the requirements of informed consent 
compromises informed consent and autonomy.  
 This conclusion does not, in itself, validate our argument that the 
blind clinical trial inherently compromises autonomy. As indicated, 
the blind clinical trial involves the required waiver of the right of 
medical patients to know what treatment they are receiving and to 
participate in decisionmaking about their treatment. The analysis 
just offered does not apply to the required waiver of these rights, be-
cause they are not rights guaranteed by the ethics and regulations 
governing clinical research. These rights are, however, guaranteed by 
the ethics and regulations governing medical treatment. As we will 
show, participation in blind clinical research entails the required 
waiver of treatment-related informed consent rights.99 For that rea-
son, the blind clinical trial inherently involves a compromise of  
liberal autonomy.   
                                                                                                                  
 98. It might superficially seem that libertarian acceptance of required waiver here is 
inconsistent with libertarian opposition to channeling patients into clinical trials, dis-
cussed in Part III. As to channeling, libertarians say it’s wrong to impose a condition on 
obtaining medical treatment (enrollment in a trial in order to get an experimental drug); 
here, libertarians say it’s acceptable to impose a condition (waiver of informed-consent 
rights in order to enroll in a trial). But libertarians only oppose “channeling” because the 
condition is imposed by the government, which prohibits a private bargain between drug 
companies and patients. If the condition were imposed by the drug companies themselves, 
libertarians would not object.  
 99. One of the few observers to understand that informed consent to participate in 
blind clinical research entails a kind of waiver of informed consent to treatment is Profes-
sor Mark Hall. He writes:  
Waiver of informed consent is commonly practiced in even the most ethically 
scrutinized treatment settings—medical research. Despite the rigorous applica-
tion of informed consent principles that is necessary to meet federal funding 
requirements, research subjects routinely are allowed to waive full disclosure 
in the interests of science when they participate in double-blind studies . . . .  
Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511, 567 (1997). 
While Hall agrees with us that the blind clinical trial involves a waiver of informed con-
sent, he draws a different conclusion from this understanding. Hall argues that since waiv-
er of informed consent is accepted in clinical research, it should also be accepted in clinical 
practice, as a cost-saving measure. Id.
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 For purposes of our argument, we will speak only of clinical trials 
in which all subjects receive medical treatment: active-controlled tri-
als rather than placebo-controlled trials. We believe our argument 
applies also to placebo-controlled trials, but we leave them aside to 
forestall objections. We will proceed by asking first, whether a re-
quired waiver of treatment-related informed-consent rights such as is 
inherent in the blind clinical trial would be considered a compromise 
of autonomy in the nonresearch context. Then we will consider 
whether the fact that medical treatment is given in the research con-
text changes the analysis. 
 The principle of informed consent operates in the treatment set-
ting as well as in the research setting. In the treatment setting, in-
formed consent is thought to have two components: the right to be 
informed and the right to decide.100 It is well established that the 
right to information includes the right to know what procedures will 
be used.101
 Suppose that a doctor agreed to treat a patient only on condition 
that the doctor alone would make all treatment decisions, with no 
input from the patient, and that the doctor would not even tell the 
patient what treatment the doctor was administering. In other 
words, the doctor offers treatment on condition that the patient 
waive her right to informed consent.102 Granted, this hypothetical of-
fer of treatment involves a more extensive required waiver than the 
blind clinical trial. Here, the clinical practitioner is not merely de-
manding the waiver of some informed-consent rights; he is demand-
ing the waiver of all informed-consent rights. One could make the 
example more analogous by supposing that the doctor tells the pa-
tient he will insist on choosing randomly between two possible 
treatments, and he will refuse to inform the patient which treatment 
is chosen.103   
 In any event, would such an offer of medical treatment condi-
tioned on the waiver of informed-consent rights be a compromise of 
                                                                                                                  
 100. BERG ET AL., supra note 33, at 88-89. 
 101. Id. at 54-55 (“Almost all courts and statutes require that the physician provide the 
patient with an explanation of the nature of the procedure or treatment, that is, what is 
going to happen.”). Actually, the regulations, by their terms, also require “a description of 
the procedures to be followed, and identification of any procedures which are experi-
mental.” HHS, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1); FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(1). If strictly interpreted, 
this rule would prohibit the blind clinical trial, but it is (sensibly) interpreted to require 
only a description of the procedures that might be followed in a randomized experiment.  
 102. Why would the doctor insist on such a waiver of informed-consent rights, assum-
ing there is no research involved? Perhaps he sees the obligations placed on him by the 
informed-consent doctrine as pointlessly burdensome. 
 103. In this modified example, however, it’s hard to come up with a motivation for the 
doctor’s behavior that is not utterly frivolous. Perhaps the doctor wants some unpredicta-
bility in his life (hence the random assignment), and he also wants some mystery (hence 
the nondisclosure). 
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autonomy in the nonresearch setting? Once again, the offer would not 
compromise autonomy under the libertarian conception of autonomy. 
Libertarians resist limitations on freedom of contract; they tend to 
believe that all rights can be waived. Richard Epstein and other lib-
ertarian bioethicists oppose the rule against waivers of liability for 
medical malpractice.104 Robert Nozick even argued that one should be 
able to sell oneself into slavery.105
 But under the dominant liberal conception of autonomy, informed 
consent is not merely a default rule supplied by the state, subject to 
change; it is a value that doctors are supposed to respect. As stated in 
the AMA’s Code of Medical Ethics: 
The patient’s right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only 
if the patient possesses enough information to enable an informed 
choice. The patient should make his or her own determination 
about treatment. The physician’s obligation is to present the medi-
cal facts accurately to the patient or to the individual responsible 
for the patient’s care and to make recommendations for manage-
ment in accordance with good medical practice.106
Required waiver of informed-consent rights would of course violate 
this provision of the AMA Code of Ethics. 
 It is true that the right to informed consent in the treatment con-
text can be waived at the volition of the patient, unlike a medical-
malpractice claim of negligent injury.107 But the paradigmatic waiver 
situation is one in which the doctor begins telling the patient about 
the risks of treatment, and the patient says, “Stop, I don’t want to 
hear any more.” Or the doctor begins explaining to the patient that 
two or more courses of treatment are available, and the patient says, 
“You decide.” In such cases, the patient has the opportunity to receive 
information and/or participate in decisions, but declines to take ad-
vantage of the opportunity. By contrast, the offer of medical treat-
ment conditioned on a waiver of informed consent seeks to deprive 
the patient of these opportunities at the beginning.  
 For the doctor to demand waiver of informed consent as a condi-
tion of treatment is at least arguably inconsistent with some of the 
court decisions establishing the doctrine of informed consent in the 
treatment context.108 Physician-demanded waiver is also arguably 
                                                                                                                  
 104. Epstein, Contractual Principle Versus Legislative Fixes, supra note 29, at 505-11. 
The leading case on the unenforceability of prior waivers of medical malpractice liability is 
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 446-47 (Cal. 1963). 
 105. NOZICK, supra note 27, at 331. 
 106. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, OPINION 8.08 (2010) 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-
medical-ethics/opinion808.shtml. 
 107. BERG ET AL., supra note 33, at 85-90.  
 108. Henderson v. Milobsky, 595 F.2d 654, 656 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“[P]hysicians and 
courts alike must accept the patient’s election to know nothing and instead to rely com-
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inconsistent with at least some state statutes codifying the doctrine 
of informed consent.109 And the mere fact that a waiver is valid if ini-
tiated by the patient does not necessarily mean that it is valid if de-
manded by the doctor. Patients may validly waive their right of pri-
vacy under the HIPAA regulations, but the regulations state that in 
general, “[a] covered entity may not condition the provision to an in-
dividual of treatment, payment, enrollment in the health plan, or eli-
gibility for benefits on the provision of an authorization.”110   
 Regardless of whether the practice would be illegal,111 it seems 
clear that in the nonresearch context, offering medical treatment on 
condition that the patient waives her right to informed consent would 
be a compromise of liberal autonomy. Does it make a difference when 
the treatment is given in the research context? Our position is that it 
makes a difference in the bottom-line ethical evaluation of the prac-
tice, but that moving from the nonresearch context to the research 
                                                                                                                  
pletely upon the physician . . . . The keystone, however, is that it is the patient, not the 
physician or the medical profession, who defines the scope of the pre-decision opportunity 
to know.”); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1972) (“[A] medical doctor need not make 
disclosure of risks when the patient requests that he not be so informed.”). 
 109. The New York informed consent statute provides:  
It shall be a defense to any action for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice 
based upon an alleged failure to obtain such an informed consent that… the pa-
tient assured the medical, dental or podiatric practitioner that he did not want 
to be informed of the matters to which he would be entitled to be informed . . . .  
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-d(4) (McKinney 2010).   
 110. 45 C.F.R § 164.508(b)(4) (2010). There are exceptions to this general rule. One is 
that a provider of care in the context of clinical research may condition treatment on re-
ceipt of an authorization. Id.
 111. Recognition that informed consent to research entails a waiver of informed con-
sent to treatment raises perhaps the tiniest of legal clouds over the blind clinical trial. The 
HHS regulations contain an antipreemption provision. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(f). So if state-law 
doctrines of informed consent prohibit the offering of medical treatment on condition that 
the patient waives informed-consent rights, the blind clinical trial may be a violation of 
state law, which arguably is not preempted by the regulations. Furthermore, the HHS and 
FDA regulations make it a condition of IRB approval of research that  
[n]o informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory 
language through which the subject or the representative is made to waive or 
appear to waive any of the subject’s legal rights, or releases or appears to re-
lease the investigator, the sponsor, the institution or its agents from liability 
for negligence. 
HHS, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116; see also FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2010). The main purpose of this 
provision is clearly to preclude a waiver of negligence liability for personal injuries. That 
does not, however, make the provision inapplicable to the required waiver of informed con-
sent, especially since the doctrine of informed consent, in the treatment context, is consid-
ered part of the doctrine of negligence. See BERG ET AL., supra note 33, at 134-36. By waiv-
ing her right to information about treatment, and to determine the course of her treatment, 
a subject could be considered to have waived a right to be free of negligence.  
 Of course, we do not think for a moment that the blind clinical trial will be held to be 
illegal. Even if the legal analysis just offered were given any credence, some way would be 
found to uphold the blind clinical trial, because of its great social utility—and properly so. 
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context does not change the analytical conclusion that liberal auton-
omy is compromised.  
 There has been an extensive debate over whether and how the 
ethics of medical treatment differs from the ethics of medical re-
search (including research that involves medical treatment).112 Su-
perficially, our argument that the blind clinical trial entails a waiver 
of treatment-related rights might seem to commit us to the position 
that there is no difference between the ethics of treatment and the 
ethics of research. In fact, we take the opposite position. To avoid 
confusion, then, it may be best to distinguish between different reac-
tions our argument might provoke. 
 Some might accept our claim that required waiver of treatment-
related rights compromises liberal autonomy. They might say that 
just as required waiver in the non-research context would be unethi-
cal, so also the blind clinical trial is unethical, as it compromises au-
tonomy. They might conclude that the blind clinical trial should  
be abolished.  
 We, of course, disagree. We believe that required waiver would be 
at least presumptively unethical in the nonresearch context, but we 
draw a different conclusion in the research context. The blind clinical 
trial is ethical, even though it compromises liberal autonomy, be-
cause it serves social welfare. 
 A more likely objection to our argument is that required waiver of 
treatment-related rights does not compromise autonomy in the re-
search context, even though it would compromise autonomy in the 
nonresearch context (and would probably be unethical in that con-
text). Here, there is no disagreement over the bottom-line ethical 
conclusion: Both we and our objectors would apply a different ethical 
standard to required waiver in the research context than in the non-
research context. The disagreement is whether required waiver of 
treatment-related rights in clinical research (1) compromises auton-
omy, but is nevertheless ethical (our position), or (2) does not com-
promise autonomy at all. 
 Patients in the nonresearch context have an autonomy interest in 
knowing what treatment they are receiving, and in participating in 
the treatment decision. What happens to this autonomy interest 
when the treatment is provided as part of a medical experiment? In 
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our view, it makes more sense to say that the autonomy interest is 
overridden by social welfare than to say that it simply disappears.  
 A third possible reaction to our argument is that required waiver 
of treatment-related rights does not compromise autonomy either in 
the research context or in the nonresearch context. This is a libertar-
ian position. It is not really opposed to our argument, because we on-
ly claim that the blind clinical trial compromises liberal autonomy, 
not libertarian autonomy. If you are a libertarian, you can support 
the blind clinical trial without conceding that it involves any com-
promise of autonomy (at least with respect to the required waiver of 
rights). If you are a liberal who supports the blind clinical trial, you 
should concede that it involves some compromise of autonomy. 
VI.   SELECTION OF SUBJECTS
 The value of autonomy, at least on the liberal view, is more con-
cerned with preventing people from being included in experiments 
against their will than with preventing people from being excluded
from experiments against their will. Nevertheless, laws that exclude 
people from being subjects also raise autonomy issues. Under HHS 
regulations an IRB cannot approve research unless it determines 
that the “[r]isks to subjects are reasonable in relation to the antici-
pated benefits” of the research to subjects and others. 113 If the risks 
are too high, the research cannot proceed, even if the subjects would 
have given fully informed consent. This limitation reflects a welfarist 
paternalism. Does the paternalism of 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2), in it-
self, represent a compromise of autonomy?  
 In the situation where an entire study has been scrapped as too 
risky, the compromise of autonomy seems somewhat attenuated. 
There are no individuals who seek to enter the study, because the 
study does not occur. If an experiment does not take place because 
the IRB deems it too risky, whose autonomy is compromised? It may 
be possible to say that autonomy in the abstract is compromised; that 
position seems plausible to us. It is also plausible to say, in such a 
case, that the regulations, as enforced by the IRB, have limited the 
autonomy of the researchers, who have been barred from their cho-
sen course. However, we are interested here in the autonomy of the 
subjects or potential subjects.  
 The possible compromise of autonomy is sharper when particular 
individuals are prevented from becoming subjects because it is 
deemed, as to them, that the risks would not be reasonable in rela-
tion to the benefits. So we can ask again: If someone would like to be 
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a subject, but is excluded because the experiment would be too risky 
for him, has the person’s autonomy been compromised?  
 Under the libertarian conception of autonomy, it seems the an-
swer must be yes. To libertarians, paternalistic limitations on choice 
are inherently violative of autonomy.114 Under the dominant liberal 
conception, the situation is somewhat more complicated. Barring 
someone from being a subject could be a compromise of autonomy 
under the liberal conception. The prospective subject might have 
made a completely informed, voluntary and authentic decision to par-
ticipate, even though the experiment poses particular risks to him 
that are, under the regulations, unreasonable.115 The advocate of lib-
eral autonomy could point to imperfections in real-world informed-
consent procedures as a justification for the exclusion of high-risk 
subjects from trials; maybe the volunteers would not fully compre-
hend the risks, despite procedures that seek to guarantee informed 
consent.116 But at some point, we think, even the advocate of liberal 
autonomy would have to agree that a welfarist-paternalist limitation 
on who can be a subject means that autonomy is being compromised 
for the sake of another value, namely, welfare.  
A. Gelsinger Case
 In short, the paternalism of the regulations, with respect to the 
selection of subjects, represents a compromise of autonomy both on 
the libertarian view and on the liberal view of autonomy. However, 
the regulations do not go far enough in establishing a welfarist crite-
rion for the selection of subjects. This is one conclusion that can be 
drawn from the tragic Gelsinger case, in which a relatively healthy 
subject died after researchers were persuaded not to test a gene-
therapy treatment on terminal babies, but instead to test it on adults 
with a mild form of the genetic disease. This case has previously been 
addressed by one of the authors;117 we now add legal analysis.  
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 Jesse Gelsinger had a relatively mild form of ornithine transcar-
bamylase (OTC) deficiency, a rare metabolic disorder in which the 
liver is unable to process ammonia. In 1999, at the age of eighteen, 
he enrolled as a subject in a Phase I gene-therapy trial for the treat-
ment of OTC deficiency. The gene-therapy trial was conducted by re-
searchers at the University of Pennsylvania’s Institute for Human 
Gene Therapy (Penn IHGT). On September 13, 1999, the researchers 
injected Gelsinger with a weakened cold virus (adenovirus) carrying 
corrective OTC genes. Four days later, he was dead from what was 
probably an immune reaction to the virus vector. This was the first 
death directly attributed to gene therapy.118
 The gene therapy treatment that researchers tested on Gelsinger 
was not designed to treat people who, like Gelsinger, had a relatively 
mild form of OTC deficiency. The treatment was intended for neo-
nates with the more severe and usually fatal form of the disease. The 
researchers had originally planned to test the treatment on terminal 
neonates. But they were persuaded by Art Caplan, a famed bioethi-
cist at the University of Pennsylvania, to test the treatment instead 
on adults—men with a relatively mild version of the disease or fe-
male carriers of the disease. In an interview with the New York 
Times after Gelsinger’s death, Caplan justified his intervention by 
saying that parents of dying infants are incapable of giving informed 
consent: “They are coerced by the disease of their child.”119
 Penn IHGT’s protocol for the OTC gene therapy trial had been re-
viewed by the FDA and by the Recombinant DNA Advisory Commit-
tee (RAC) of the NIH.120 There was substantial opposition to the trial 
in the RAC because monkeys had died after being given a similar 
(but much stronger) treatment, and because of the potential for lethal 
liver inflammation.121 The RAC ultimately approved the trial, with 
one member dissenting, after Penn IHGT agreed to deliver the virus 
vector intravenously rather than directly into the liver.122 The FDA, 
however, was concerned about the infection of reproductive cells 
(germline modification) from this mode of delivery, and it made Penn 
IHGT go back to direct liver injection.123
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 After Gelsinger’s death, there were investigations by the FDA, the 
University of Pennsylvania, and a Senate subcommittee.124 The FDA 
suspended gene-therapy trials by Penn IHGT, and the University of 
Pennsylvania subsequently limited it to animal studies.125 Gelsinger’s 
family also filed a lawsuit against various individuals and institutions 
associated with the trial.126 The suit was settled on undisclosed terms.127
 A major focus of the investigations and the lawsuit was deficien-
cies in the informed-consent process. The FDA determined that Penn 
IHGT improperly failed to disclose to Gelsinger that other, previous-
ly-treated subjects in the study had suffered serious side effects and 
that monkeys had died in animal studies.128 Attempting to draw les-
sons from Gelsinger’s death, Theodore Friedmann, director of the 
Program in Human Gene Therapy at the University of California at 
San Diego, stated:  
The single most important mechanism for ensuring patient protec-
tion from inherent risks of clinical experiments, unrealistic expec-
tations, and potential conflicts of interest of the investigator is ac-
curate and full disclosure of potential risks and benefits and a 
well-executed informed consent process.129
 Informed consent does play an important (welfarist) role in pro-
tecting subjects from harm, as suggested previously. It is not clear, 
however, that even a perfect informed-consent process would have 
saved Gelsinger’s life. Gelsinger’s motivation was highly altruistic. 
Before he entered the experiment, he reportedly told a friend: 
“What’s the worst that can happen to me? . . . I die, and it’s for  
the babies.”130
 Another finding by the FDA was that Gelsinger should not have 
been allowed to participate in the study because he had too much 
ammonia in his blood at the time he was given the experimental 
treatment.131 Once again, however, it is not clear whether Gelsinger’s 
ammonia level contributed to his death. In its February 14, 2000 re-
sponse to FDA action, Penn IHGT stressed that “available scientific 
evidence does not establish any causal link between Jesse Gelsinger’s 
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plasma ammonia level prior to the infusion of genes and his 
death.”132
 The FDA did not fault the Penn IHGT researchers for their deci-
sion to use adults as subjects instead of terminal infants as originally 
planned.133 We, however, believe that this was the most serious error. 
Though it is not clear what role other defects of the gene therapy tri-
al played in Gelsinger’s death, it is clear that Gelsinger would not 
have died if the Penn IHGT researchers had adhered to their original 
plan of testing the gene therapy treatment on terminal infants. Un-
der the original plan, any deaths to subjects would have been of in-
fants who would have died shortly in any event. 
 It is obvious to us and, we hope, to the reader, that the Penn 
IHGT researchers, influenced by Caplan, made the ethically wrong 
selection of subjects. While this conclusion is easy to draw in hind-
sight, the ethical and scientific issues were far more clouded while 
the experiment was pending. Nevertheless, if we evaluate the subject 
selection decision based on the knowledge that Penn IHGT possessed 
at the time, it was still the wrong decision.  
 The Penn IHGT researchers had to choose between a group of sub-
jects that could give fully autonomous consent (adults such as Gel-
singer) and a group of subjects for which they could get only substi-
tuted consent (terminal infants, whose parents would consent). One 
can question Caplan’s view that the parents of infants with OTC de-
ficiency inherently could not give informed consent. However, an im-
plicit corollary of Caplan’s position probably has wider appeal: it is 
better to get informed consent from fully autonomous adult subjects 
than to get substituted consent from the legal representatives of in-
competent subjects. If all else were equal, we would not fault Penn 
IHGT for following this principle and selecting the subject group that 
could give fully autonomous consent. But the adults had a worse 
risk/benefit ratio than the terminal infants. The adults had a great 
deal more to lose, as the infants would die soon even if not exposed to 
a potentially toxic treatment. The adults also had less to gain, as the 
treatment might possibly keep one or more of the infants alive. Penn 
IHGT could perhaps justifiably assume that the probability of killing 
an adult subject was very low, and it could certainly assume that the 
probability of saving an infant subject was very low. Still, from a wel-
farist perspective, the right choice should have been clear, even in 
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advance of Gelsinger’s death. Why prefer a small expected harm 
(adult subjects) to a small expected benefit (terminal infants)? There 
is no good reason, regardless of whether someone is prepared to con-
sent. The most serious defect of the OTC trial, then, was not too little 
respect for autonomy (in the sense of lax informed consent), but too 
much respect for autonomy in the selection of subjects.  
B. Do the Regulations Require Selection of the Subject Group with 
the Best Risk/Benefit Ratio? 
 We now consider the regulatory provisions on subject selection, 
using the Gelsinger case as an example. Do the regulations speak to 
whether the ethically correct selection of subjects in the Gelsinger 
case (terminal neonates, as originally planned, rather than adults) 
was also legally permissible or even mandated? There are special 
provisions in the HHS regulations regarding research on neonates 
and children (and the regulations on children have parallel provi-
sions in the FDA regulations).134 The use of terminal neonates for the 
research almost certainly would not have violated these regulations, 
as the research was therapeutic; in terms of the regulations, the re-
search “[held] out the prospect of enhancing the probability of surviv-
al of the neonate to the point of viability,”135 and “[held] out the pro-
spect of direct benefit for the individual subject.”136
 Still, the more general provisions of the regulations (subpart A of 
the HHS regulations, duplicated also in the FDA regulations) also 
bear on the subject-selection issue in the Gelsinger case. As noted, 45 
C.F.R. § 46.111(a) sets forth a list of requirements that must be met 
before an IRB may approve research. Specifically, 45 C.F.R. § 
46.111(a)(1) states the requirement that “[r]isks to subjects are min-
imized: (i) By using procedures which are consistent with sound re-
search design and which do not unnecessarily expose subjects to risk, 
and (ii) whenever appropriate, by using procedures already being 
performed on the subjects for diagnostic or treatment purposes.”137
The requirement that “[r]isks to subjects are minimized” could be in-
terpreted as a welfarist criterion for subject selection: select those 
subjects for whom the experiment will be least risky. While in one 
sense both potential subject groups in the Gelsinger case—terminal 
infants and adults with a mild form of the disease—faced the risk 
that they would die as a result of the treatment, in a more important 
sense the risk of losing future life years was much smaller for the 
terminal infants, since they would have died anyway. So risks to sub-
                                                                                                                  
 134. The Penn IHGT experiment was subject to both the FDA and HHS regulations. 
 135. 45 C.F.R. § 46.205(b)(1)(i) (2010).  
 136. HHS, 45 C.F.R. § 46.405; FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 50.52 (2010). 
 137. HHS, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1); FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(1).  
2011] WELFARE VERSUS AUTONOMY  341
jects were not minimized, on this interpretation, when the investiga-
tors decided not to use terminal infants as subjects. On the other 
hand, section 46.111(a)(1) could be interpreted not as a general in-
junction to minimize risk, but as an injunction to minimize risk in 
the choice of procedures. It could be interpreted as bearing solely on 
the choice of procedures, not on the choice of subjects.138
 Also relevant is section 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2). As noted, that 
section requires that “[r]isks to subjects are reasonable in relation to 
anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the 
knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result.”139 Arguably, 
risks are not reasonable in relation to benefits if the experiment 
would be less risky for another class of subjects. Once again, howev-
er, this is not a necessary interpretation. While the risk-benefit pro-
vision does reflect some paternalism, as previously discussed, the de-
termination of whether the risk to a subject is too high in relation to 
benefits could be the same whether or not there are other subjects 
who face lower risks. 
 Even leaving aside the possibility of using terminal infants as sub-
jects, the entire Penn IHGT study, or the use of Gelsinger as a sub-
ject, might have been inconsistent with 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2). As 
suggested by opponents of the trial in the RAC, the risks to adult 
subjects might have been unreasonable in relation to the knowledge 
to be gained regarding treatment of infants with the disease. Also, 
Gelsinger might have been an improper subject, under section 
46.111(a)(2), because the high level of ammonia in his blood meant 
that the risk to him was unreasonable in relation to the possible ben-
efits of the study. But assume that the risks to the class of adult sub-
jects, or to Gelsinger alone, were not excessive when measured only 
against the benefits of the study. HHR regulations could then be in-
terpreted as meaning that it was not improper to select the class of 
adult subjects, even though another class of subjects had a better 
risk/benefit ratio.140 That is not how we would interpret 45 C.F.R. § 
46.111(a)(2), but it is a plausible interpretation.     
 Thus far, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 seems to give some support, but cer-
tainly not conclusive support, to the welfarist approach of choosing 
the subject class with the best risk/benefit ratio, even when those 
subjects cannot give autonomous consent. However, 45 C.F.R. § 
46.111(a)(3), the only provision that specifically relates to the selec-
tion of subjects, points vaguely in the other direction. As noted previ-
ously, that provision states the requirement that:  
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Selection of subjects is equitable. In making this assessment the 
IRB should take into account the purposes of the research and the 
setting in which the research will be conducted and should be par-
ticularly cognizant of the special problems of research involving 
vulnerable populations, such as children, prisoners, pregnant 
women, handicapped, or mentally disabled persons, or economical-
ly or educationally disadvantaged persons.141
 In the abstract, the requirement that the selection of subjects be 
“equitable” might not mean that researchers should select subjects 
who can give fully autonomous consent over subjects who have a bet-
ter risk/benefit ratio. To us, such an approach to subject selection 
would not seem equitable at all. However, the term “equitable,” and 
even the term “justice,” has taken on a rather tendentious meaning 
in human subjects research, one which evinces a reluctance to exper-
iment on vulnerable populations. This is largely due to the Belmont 
Report, which states:  
[I]t can be considered a matter of social justice that there is an or-
der of preference in the selection of classes of subjects (e.g., adults 
before children) and that some classes of potential subjects (e.g., 
the institutionalized mentally infirm or prisoners) may be involved 
as research subjects, if at all, only on certain conditions.142
A general reluctance to experiment on vulnerable subjects can be jus-
tified on welfarist grounds, but not where, as in the Gelsinger case, 
vulnerable subjects have a far better risk/benefit ratio than fully au-
tonomous subjects. 
 The regulations do not clearly indicate whether the selection of 
subjects in the Gelsinger case was legally right or wrong. More gen-
erally, while the regulations impose welfarist criteria for the approv-
al of research and the selection of subjects, they do not clearly require 
the selection of subjects who face lesser risks over those who face 
greater risks. On subject selection, the regulations go some distance 
in compromising autonomy for the sake of welfare, but not  
far enough. 
VI.   CONCLUSION
 As a descriptive matter, autonomy is not an absolute constraint on 
the pursuit of social welfare through human subjects research in the 
United States. To a greater extent than is generally recognized, au-
tonomy is compromised for the sake of welfare. Sometimes experi-
ments are done with no consent at all, pursuant to one of the regula-
tory exceptions to the informed-consent requirement. Sometimes pro-
spective subjects are excluded from a trial for their own welfare, even 
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though they are prepared to give informed consent. Patients who 
want experimental drugs are pressured to enter clinical trials by re-
strictive drug laws. And the blind clinical trial itself inherently com-
promises liberal autonomy through the requirement that subjects 
waive their treatment-related informed-consent rights.   
 As to some of the areas we have discussed, autonomy is compro-
mised more under the libertarian conception and less under the lib-
eral conception; as to others, autonomy is compromised more under 
the liberal conception and less (or not at all) under the libertarian 
conception. Autonomy under the libertarian conception is probably 
most compromised in subject selection (willing volunteers barred 
from becoming subjects if they face a risk deemed unreasonable) and 
in the channeling of patients into clinical trials through restrictive 
drug laws (the government interposing itself between a willing buyer 
and willing seller, to serve the interests of third parties). Autonomy 
under the liberal conception is probably most compromised in the 
channeling of patients into clinical trials through restrictive drug 
laws (because the liberal conception of autonomy condemns induce-
ments to participate in an experiment that fall short of actual coer-
cion), and in the emergency-research and minimal-risk exceptions to 
informed consent (because of liberal autonomy’s strong default posi-
tion against experimentation). 
 As a normative matter, autonomy should not be an absolute con-
straint on the pursuit of social welfare through human subjects re-
search. For the most part, we endorse the balance between autonomy 
and welfare set by United States’ laws and regulations—which is to 
say, we endorse the compromise of autonomy for the sake of welfare. 
The channeling of patients into clinical trials through restrictive 
drug laws is justified on the convincing assumption that unrestricted 
access would delay drug trials, resulting in poorer health outcomes 
overall. The exceptions for emergency research and minimal-risk re-
search are also justified, on the less powerful but still-convincing as-
sumption that they really do increase welfare. The blind clinical trial 
is so crucial to the advancement of medical knowledge that requiring 
subjects to waive their treatment-related rights of informed consent 
as a condition of receiving medical treatment is obviously justified.143
 It is in the area of subject selection that we demonstrate we do not 
follow a completely Panglossian approach of endorsing the existing 
regulatory provisions as welfare-maximizing. We do endorse the pa-
ternalistic rule that subjects must be excluded from an experiment if 
the experiment would pose an unreasonable risk to them.  However, 
the compromise of autonomy in subject selection does not go far 
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enough. There should be a clearer welfarist directive to prefer the 
subject group with the superior risk/benefit ratio. Such a directive 
would have prevented the tragedy of the Gelsinger case; that case 
demonstrates what can happen when autonomy is not properly  
subordinated to welfare.   
